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What fraction of the business cycle volatility of government purchases is accounted for as endogenous
reactions to overall macroeconomic conditions? We answer this question in the framework of a neoclassical
representative household model where the provision of a public consumption good is decided upon
endogenously and in a time-consistent fashion. A simple frictionless version of such a model with
aggregate productivity as the sole driving force can explain almost all the volatility of U.S. non-defense
government consumption expenditures. However, such a model fails to match other important features
of the business cycle dynamics of public consumption, which comes out as not persistent enough and
too synchronized with the cycle. We add implementation lags and implementation costs in the budgeting
process to the model, plus taste shocks for public consumption relative to private consumption, and
achieve a substantially better match to the data. All these ingredients are essential to improve the fit.
Depending on the precise specification of the flow utility function over private consumption, public














Public consumption has interesting business cycle properties, which we carefully document in
this paper. It isaboutasvolatileas privateconsumption, roughly aspersistentas aggregate out-
put and, unlike any other component of aggregate demand, contemporaneously acyclical, but
mildly procyclical with one- and two-year lags. Overall, public consumption is the least pro-
cyclical component of aggregate demand. We deﬁne public consumption as the counterpart of
private consumption within government purchases: “government expenditures on consump-
tion and investment goods”, as stipulated in the NIPA accounts.
Standard business cycle analysis typically treats government purchases as an exogenous
stochastic process. As such they appear in at least three different strands of the literature: as
a wedge and potential driving force of aggregate ﬂuctuations (see Baxter and King, 1992, Chari
et al., 2007, or Leeper et al., 2010, for instance); in the vast empirical literature on the sign and
magnitude of the government spending multiplier as a source of an exogenous shock to be
identiﬁed (see Shapiro and Ramey, 1998, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, Mountford and Uhlig,
2009, or Ramey, 2011, for example); and in the optimal ﬁscal policy literature (see Chari and
Kehoe, 1999, and Kocherlakota, 2010, for an overview), where there is an exogenous stream of
government purchases that needs to be ﬁnanced by either taxes or debt.
In this paper we reverse the perspective and ask: once we allow for a mechanism of en-
dogenous public good provision, what fraction of the business cycle ﬂuctuations of govern-
ment purchases is accounted for as endogenous reactions to overall macroeconomic condi-
tions? And how much volatility is generated through shocks directly related to the provision of
public goods, for example preference shocks between private and public consumption?
To answer this question we draw on previous work by Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008)
(KKR henceforth). The KKR framework is a natural starting point for our quantitative analysis,
because it features a standard neoclassical modeling of the macroeconomic business cycle and
adds to that time-consistent public policy.1 The model has a government that cannot com-
mit ex ante to a path of future public consumption, but takes into account this path and how
it depends on current decisions. The solution concept for the game between successive gov-
ernments is the Markov-perfect equilibrium. Public consumption is ﬁnanced by linear income
taxes. We abstract from government debt and transfers. We discipline the exercise by requiring
that the model match the business cycle features of public consumption described above.
Asaﬁrststep, weaddconventionalaggregateproductivityshocksasthesoleaggregatedriv-
ing force to the KKR framework, thus making it as close as possible to a standard real business
1In the words of Kocherlakota (2010): “These literatures [on time-consistency and dynamic political economy]
examine the properties of equilibrium outcomes of particular dynamic games. Hence, they are trying to model
actual behavior of governments.” (emphasis in the original).
2cycle model.2 Our ﬁrst result is that such a model can explain almost all the volatility of govern-
ment consumption in the data, but it falls short in terms of persistence and it makes govern-
ment consumption almost perfectly and contemporaneously correlated with the cycle.
Motivated by the dynamic correlation pattern of government consumption in the data, we
add an implementation lag to the physical environment: today’s government can only decide
about public consumption tomorrow and tomorrow’s government is bound by this decision.
Implementation lags are a realistic feature of the budgeting process given the numerous bu-
reaucracies involved with government expenditures. This helps us push the peak correlation of
public consumption and output away from contemporaneous, but still leaves us with far too
high a dynamic correlation and too low persistence.
We then include a taste shock for public consumption (relative to private consumption)
in the ﬂow utility of the representative household, which leads to a decoupling of economic
aggregates and government consumption. On its own, such a shock does not lead to sizeable
outputﬂuctuationsorrealisticbusinesscycles. Moreover,thissecondshockmakesgovernment
consumption too volatile and reduces persistence further compared to the data.
We remedy this, ﬁnally, by introducing implementation costs (in addition to the implemen-
tationlags). Wethusassumethatitiscostlyforgovernmentstodeviatetoomuchfromprevious
budgets. One interpretation for these somewhat reduced-form adjustment costs are budget
planning costs. Implementation lags and costs are modeled similarly to, respectively, time-to-
build and convex adjustment costs for capital in standard macroeconomic models.
Our second result is that within the class of models we are studying only the model with
two aggregate shocks and two implementation frictions (in addition to the “no commitment”-
friction) can produce a reasonable ﬁt to all three dimensions of the business cycle dynamics of
government purchases: volatility, persistence and dynamic comovement.
Our ﬁnal result is the answer to our original research question: depending on the speciﬁ-
cation of the felicity function over private consumption, public consumption and leisure, 25 to
40 percent of the ﬂuctuations of public consumption are explained by endogenous reactions to
macroeconomic conditions.
Our paper has also a methodological contribution: we show how global solution methods
can be applied to models of time-consistent public good provision with multiple aggregate
shocks and that parameterizations of the equilibrium law of motion that include higher order
terms of the aggregate state variables can improve the accuracy of the solution.
2Most of the related literature on endogenous public policy in a dynamic environment so far has focussed on
long-run steady state questions: in addition to KKR, see Krusell et al. (1997), Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), Hassler
etal. (2003),Hassleretal. (2005),Songetal. (2009),Corbaeetal. (2009),Azzimonti(2011),BaiandLagunoff(2011).
Models with aggregate shocks are featured in Azzimonti et al. (2010), Battaglini and Coate (2008), Barseghyan et
al. (2010), Debortoli and Nunes (2010), Bachmann and Bai (2011).
3The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section documents the business
cycle facts for government consumption. Section 3 sets up the model and discusses its com-
putation and calibration. Section 4 presents the results and explains in detail how each of the
model features contributes to ﬁtting the model to the observed dynamics of public consump-
tion. A ﬁnal section concludes. Details are relegated to various appendices.
2 Facts
Table 1: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS – GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION
Moment GSLC GNDC GND GC G CNDS
std(¢) 0.783 0.777 0.943 1.173 1.362 0.705
rho(¢) 0.296 0.218 0.412 0.461 0.534 0.362
correl(¢,Y ) 0.003 -0.013 0.235 -0.034 0.049 0.862
correl(¢,Y¡1) 0.306 0.209 0.428 0.206 0.340 0.223
correl(¢,Y¡2) 0.375 0.364 0.397 0.390 0.433 -0.283
correl(¢,CNDS) 0.217 0.104 0.263 -0.056 0.016 -
correl(¢,CNDS¡1) 0.302 0.199 0.430 0.150 0.292 -
correl(¢,CNDS¡2) 0.320 0.381 0.438 0.446 0.480 -
Notes: data source is the BEA (NIPA data). All variables are annual, the sample goes from 1960-2006. They are
deﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators, logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing pa-
rameter 6.25. ‘GSLC’ stands for state and local government consumption. ‘GNDC’ denotes total non-defense con-
sumption, ‘GND’ total non-defense purchases and ‘GC’ total government consumption. ‘G’ is total government
purchases. ‘std(¢)’ denotes the time series volatility of an aggregate variable, rho(¢) its ﬁrst-order autocorrelation.
‘correl(¢,Y )’ denotes the contemporaneous correlation with aggregate GDP , ‘correl(¢,Y¡1) ’ and ‘correl(¢,Y¡2)’
the correlation with aggregate GDP one and two years lagged, respectively. ‘CNDS’ stands for nondurable and
services consumption.
Table 1 shows the business cycle moments for state and local government consumption
(GSLC), our baseline government purchases aggregate, as well as other subaggregates of total
government purchases. All variables are annual, logged and detrended with a Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 (see Ravn and Uhlig, 2002). We ﬁnd:
1. GSLC is at least as volatile as private consumption expenditures, measured as spending
on nondurables and services, and roughly half as volatile as GDP (1.34%).
2. GSLC is fairly persistent, at least as persistent as GDP (0.292).
3. GSLC is contemporaneously acyclical.
4. GSLC is dynamically procyclical.
4Stateandlocalgovernmentconsumptionbelongsbydeﬁnitiontothenon-defensecategory,
which is a plausible candidate for endogenous expenditures. The structural vector autoregres-
sions literature often takes the same view and uses military purchases to identify exogenous
government spending shocks. Focussing on the state and local level also allows us to abstract
from government debt, which would complicate the model and the computation considerably.
Furthermore, GSLC is roughly 10 percent of GDP and slightly under 50 percent of total govern-
ment purchases, which makes it the largest individual category at this level of aggregation.
In any event, Table 1 also shows that total non-defense government consumption (GNDC),
which includes federal consumption expenditures, has very similar business cycle properties
to GSLC. Persistence is if anything low in GSLC, compared to other subaggregates. And the
dynamic correlation pattern of state and local government consumption can also be found in
other aggregates, such as non-defense purchases, total public consumption and total govern-
ment purchases.3 We view this as at least suggestive that the causes of the business cycle of
government purchases should be sought in aggregate factors.
We use the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 6.25 to capture very nar-
rowly the business cycle dynamics of government purchases. Bachmann and Bai (2011) argues
that government purchases also have important medium-frequency dynamics that we want
to exclude here. Table 9 in Appendix A indeed shows that, using a bandpass ﬁlter which lets
through frequencies from 2 to 8 years, we get similar results to the HP(6.25) ﬁlter. Finally, Fig-
ures 2 to 4 in the same appendix show, using data from the Annual Survey of State Government
Finances, that the dynamic correlation pattern for aggregate state and local government con-
sumption with GDP also holds for most U.S. states individually.
The evidence taken together leads us to treat the four properties of GSLC from the begin-
ning of this section as new stylized business cycle facts. They are also suggestive of some of the
model ingredients we use in the quantitative exercise that follows. The fact that the dynamic
correlogram between public consumption and output/private consumption is tilted towards
public consumption lagging the cycle suggests implementation lags. We will also show that
without a second shock a representative agent model overshoots the level of the correlogram
(see Bachmann and Bai, 2011, for an alternative story in a heterogeneous agent framework).
Finally, persistence suggests the budget implementation costs we use.
3Table 8 in Appendix A shows that this is also true for a functional disaggregation of government purchases.
53 The Model
The environment is a neoclassical representative household one-sector growth model with val-
ued public consumption. The government ﬁnances the provision of the public good with a ﬂat
rate income tax and adheres to a balanced budget rule, which for government consumption
approximates well most U.S. states’ constitution. The government cannot commit ex ante to
future public policy. Government consumption is chosen to maximize the welfare of the repre-
sentative household. The equilibrium is subject to a time-consistency requirement.
3.1 The Economic Environment
Theeconomyispopulatedbyaunitmasscontinuumofinﬁnitelylivedidenticalhouseholds. In
each period, the household is endowed with ˜ l units of time. She values private consumption, c,





Å(1¡´)log(˜ l ¡l). (1)
Lifetimeutilityfollowsthestandardexpectedutilityformwithadiscountfactor¯. µ,thepa-
rameter that governs the relative preferences for private consumption versus public consump-
tion, is assumed to be time-varying. We interpret this taste shock as a shock that directly affects
the provision of consumption in form of private versus public goods, but otherwise does not
generate realistic economic business cycle ﬂuctuations. For example, this µ¡shock does not
cause any sizeable output ﬂuctuations. Speciﬁcally, we assume that µ Æ ¯ µˆ µ, where ˆ µ follows a
two-state symmetric Markov chain with support [1¡²µ,1Å²µ] and transition matrix (
½µ 1¡½µ
1¡½µ ½µ ).
²µ governs the volatility of this process, ½µ its persistence.
Notice that, with a time-varying µ, we implicitly assume here that the relative taste shock is
primarily between private and publicconsumption with only an indirect leisure effect. We want
to highlight the time-varying tastes in the population between private and public provision of
physical commodities and use this formulation as our baseline case.4
The household owns capital, k, and rents it out in a perfectly competitive market. Capital
depreciates at rate ±. The budget constraint of the household is given by:
c Åk0 Æ(1¡±)k Å(1¡¿)(wl Årk), (2)
4With three commodities in the felicity function there is another formulation where the taste shock is between
public consumption and the private bundle including leisure. We explore this speciﬁcation as well as one with





6where k0 is the capital carried over to the next period, ¿ the ﬂat income tax rate, w the real wage
and r the rental rate for capital. k0 is restricted to lie in [0,Å1).
Aggregate output, Y , is produced by a representative ﬁrm according to an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function: Y Æ zK ®L1¡®, where K and L are the aggregate capital stock
and the aggregate labor input, respectively. z denotes aggregate productivity and is the base-
line source of aggregate uncertainty inthis economy that generates realistic economic business
cycles. Its natural logarithm evolves according to a Gaussian AR(1) process. The ﬁrm rents cap-
ital and hires labor from the household at the rental rate r and the wage rate w. Competitive
factor markets guarantee the usual factor pricing conditions: w (K,L,z) Æ (1¡®)(K/L)® and
r (K,L,z)Æ®z(K/L)®¡1.
Government consumption is decided one period ahead. We assume that the current gov-
ernment is legally bound by this decision and in this sense there is a one-period-ahead com-
mitment. This feature captures implementation lags in the budget process. In addition, the
budget authority pays a quadratic adjustment cost for changing next period’s government con-
sumption. Both government consumption of the current period and the adjustment costs are




















zK ®L1¡® . (4)
Aggregateoutputisusedforprivateandpublicconsumption,plusbudgetadjustmentcosts,






¢2ÅK 0 Æ(1¡±)K ÅzK ®L1¡®. (5)
3.2 Equilibrium with Endogenous Public Policy
Tomorrow’s government consumption is chosen to maximize the welfare of the representative
household today. When deciding tomorrow’s G, the government does not have commitment
power into the future beyond tomorrow. Without a commitment device, it is well known that
thecommitmentequilibriuminourenvironmentisnottime-consistent. Timeconsistencythus
requires imposing a subgame-perfect restriction with successive governments and the house-
holds as game players. Following KKR, we focus on a subclass of subgame-perfect equilibrium
with Markov strategies, i.e., Markov-Perfect Equilibrium (MPE). The formal deﬁnition follows.
7Deﬁnition 1 A Markov-Perfect Equilibrium for the economy is a set of functions, including a




gregate labor supply function L(K,G,z,µ,G0;ª,H), an equilibrium continuation value function
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The ﬁrst part of the equilibrium deﬁnition says that the household decision rules should
be the best response to an arbitrary decision on G0, when the future follows the equilibrium
path, a so called one-shot deviation best response. J denotes the value function corresponding
to these optimal household decisions. In addition, the best-response value function should
coincide with the equilibrium continuation value function when evaluated at the equilibrium
policyG0 Æª(K,G,z,µ).
The second part of the equilibrium deﬁnition requires that the evolution of the aggregate
capital stock and labor supply are both generated by the household’s best responses. This re-
ﬂectsrationalexpectationsonthehouseholdsideforboththeon-andoff-equilibriumpath. On
the equilibrium path, this requirement reduces to the familiar consistency restriction in a Re-
cursive Competitive Equilibrium. The third part speciﬁes the constitutional rule for the choice
of public consumption tomorrow.
83.3 Computation and Calibration
We use numerical methods to characterize and analyze the Markov-Perfect equilibrium of the
speciﬁed economy. As already intimated in the equilibrium deﬁnition, we use a global method
to iterate on the capital transition function and policy rule (H,ª) until a ﬁxed point is reached.
The ﬁxed point of H takes the following form:
logK 0 Æ a0(z,µ)Åa1(z,µ)logK Åa2(z,µ)logG Åa3(z,µ)logG0Å
a4(z,µ)(logG0)2Åa5(z,µ)(logG0)3Åa6(z,µ)logGlogG0; (7)
and that of ª takes the form
logG0 Æb0(z,µ)Åb1(z,µ)logK Åb2(z,µ)logG. (8)
Notice that these functions depend, through the coefﬁcients ai(¢,¢) and bi(¢,¢), on the level of
aggregate productivity and the taste for private versus public consumption. As for the func-
tional form in (7), we started with a simple log-linear rule instead of (7), but found the R2 to be
somewhat low, at least for some speciﬁcations of the model. After some experimentation, (7)
turned out to be a good compromise between numerical stability and accuracy. Notice that H
hastohavegoodpredictivepowernotonlyon-equilibrium,butalsoforagridofoff-equilibrium
proposals for G0. The average R2 over the discrete number of aggregate states improves from
0.9748 to 0.9999 for the baseline model, when we add nonlinear terms, and for the model with
the alternative felicity function (see Section 4.3) from 0.9368 to 1.0000.5
We set the output elasticity of capital, ® Æ 0.36 and the labor scale ˜ l Æ 1. For other param-
eters, the model is calibrated to match important features of the U.S. economy from 1960 to
2006. Annual data on government consumption correspond closely to the yearly nature of gov-
ernment budgeting and therefore we calibrate our model to this frequency. This choice implies
three parameter selections: the depreciation rate, ±, is set to 0.1; the discount rate, ¯, is ﬁxed
at 0.96. Following Tauchen (1986), we model aggregate productivity, z, as a ﬁve-state Markov
chain that approximates a Gaussian log-AR(1) process with an autocorrelation coefﬁcient of
0.8145(i.e. 0.95tothepoweroffour)and-inthebaselinecalibration-conditional standardde-
viation of 0.0123. This standard deviation is chosen to make our models approximately match
the annual percentage standard deviation of GDP in the data, 1.34%. This paper is not con-
cerned with explaining output volatility from a measured exogenous shock series, as the RBC
5See Appendix B for an outline of the algorithm, the coefﬁcients of the equilibrium law of motion and the gov-
ernment policy function for the baseline case in Tables 10 and 11, and (in Table 12) the comparison in ﬁt between
the baseline version where we use (7) and one where we use only the terms until a3(z,µ)logG0 for the parameteri-
zation of H.
9tradition which uses ﬂuctuations in the Solow residual to generate a large part of observed out-
put ﬂuctuations. Rather, this paper is about explaining government consumption dynamics
(and other components of aggregate demand), given the correct output ﬂuctuations.
The two parameters in the felicity function are calibrated as follows: ¯ µ Æ0.8512, the average
love-of-private-consumption parameter is picked to match the time-averaged G
Y -ratio based
on aggregate state and local government consumption, i.e. roughly 10.2%.6 ´, the parameter
specifying the relative weight between the private-public-consumption-composite and leisure,
is chosen to make average labor hours 0.33.
Three non-standard parameters remain to be calibrated, ½µ, ²µ and ­. We ﬁx ½µ at 0.75,
which means that a given taste for government consumption remains operative for four years
on average. ²µ and ­ are chosen to minimize a weighted quadratic form in the following sum-
mary statistics for the dynamics of public and private consumption: the standard deviations
and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of public and private consumption; the contemporaneous and
one- and two-year lagged correlations of public consumption with GDP and private consump-
tion; and the contemporaneous and one-year lagged correlations between private consump-
tion and GDP . These statistics (numbers can be found in Table 1) summarize the joint business
cycle dynamics of public and private consumption as well as GDP .
Speciﬁcally, let M be the collection of the aforementioned business cycle moments in the
data; and let ˆ Mi be the same collection of moments from the i ¡th simulation of the model.






W jj, where W denotes the conforming collection of standard
deviationsofthetwelvetimeseriesmomentsinthedata(seeTable13inAppendixBfordetails),




Table 2 summarizes two of our three results. A ‘Simple Model’ with no implementation lags,
no implementation costs and only aggregate productivity shocks can generate the volatility of
public consumption observed in the data. However, it would be wrong to conclude from this
6To take into account the higher distortion from higher government expenditures that in reality include federal
spending, investmentspending, transfers, etc., we alsostudy a calibrationwhere we positaﬁxedamountofwaste-
ful government spending that is not decided over, in order to also match the ratio of total government revenues to
GDP in the data: 0.287. While the details of the calibration are somewhat different, our basic results do not change
under this speciﬁcation. They are available on request from the authors.
7We have also experimented with a mean absolute deviation criterion with similar results.
10ﬁnding that business cycle ﬂuctuations of government consumption are exclusively the result
of aggregate productivity shocks or, more generally, constrained optimal reactions to chang-
ing macroeconomic conditions. The ‘Simple Model’ delivers basically no persistence and the
wrong correlogram for public consumption. The ‘Baseline Model’ with an implementation lag
andcalibratedimplementationcostsaswellasatasteshockdoessubstantiallybetterinmatch-
ing the data.8
Table 2: BASELINE RESULT
Business Cycle Moment Baseline Model Simple Model Data
std(G) 0.699 0.737 0.783
rho(G) 0.230 0.076 0.296
correl(G,Y ) -0.136 0.983 0.003
correl(G,Y¡1) 0.564 0.137 0.306
correl(G,Y¡2) 0.307 -0.175 0.375
correl(G,C) 0.184 0.970 0.217
correl(G,C¡1) 0.300 -0.018 0.302
correl(G,C¡2) 0.121 -0.317 0.320
std(C) 0.569 0.475 0.705
rho(C) 0.124 0.174 0.362
correl(C,Y ) 0.838 0.933 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.258 0.289 0.223
Notes: the ‘Baseline Model’ features both a one-year implementation lag and implementation costs (­ Æ 15), as
well as ²µ Æ 0.005. The ‘Simple Model’ has no implementation lags or costs (­ Æ 0), and ²µ Æ 0. All time series for
both actual and model-simulated data are logged and HP(6.25)-ﬁltered. The model-based moments have been
computed as the average from 190 simulations of length 40. Both models have the standard deviation of aggregate
productivity at 0.0123. Public consumption in the data refers to ‘GSLC’ (state and local government consump-
tion). Private consumption in the data refers to ‘CNDS’ (nondurable and services consumption). ‘std’ denotes the
standard deviation and ‘rho’ the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the corresponding time series.
Table 3 displays our third result, a variance decomposition for public consumption in the
baseline model. When we run models with the same parametrization as the ‘Baseline Model’,
but shut down, respectively, the taste shocks between private and public consumption and the
aggregate productivity shocks, we generate, respectively, 41% and 49% of the variance of public
consumption in the ‘Baseline Model’. That these variances do not quite add up to unity is in-
8We do not literally match the fact that the peak correlation in the data is, albeit just barely, at two years of
output lags. Including a two-year implementation lag into the model would mean a substantial computational
burden without much additional insight.
Table 14 in Appendix C shows that the ‘Baseline Model’ also does well in matching the same statistics, when we
replace public and private consumption with their respective ratios over aggregate output.
Thebusinesscyclemomentsofothermacroeconomicaggregatesarestandardandbasicallythesameacrossmodel
speciﬁcations.
11dicative of small endogenous interaction effects in the joint response of public consumption to
these shocks. This means that a substantial fraction of government consumption ﬂuctuations
over the business cycle can be viewed as endogenous reactions to changing macroeconomic
conditions. It also means that the bulk of the business cycle ﬂuctuations of public consump-
tion, however, is driven by shocks that directly affect the optimal mix of private versus public
provision of consumption goods. We nevertheless note that aggregate productivity shocks are
necessary to generate realistic GDP ﬂuctuations, as the model without z-shocks basically gen-
erates no GDP volatility.
Table 3: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION - BASELINE MODEL
Contribution of z-shocks Contribution of µ-shocks Both
40.82% 49.49% 90.31%
Notes: seenotestoTable2. Theﬁrstcolumndisplaysthefractionofthetimeseriesvariance ofpublicconsumption
in the ‘Baseline Model’, when the µ-shocks are shut down, but the model is parameterized the same otherwise.
The second column shuts down the aggregate productivity shocks. The third column is simply the sum of these
variances.
4.2 Explaining the Mechanism
How do the various elements of the baseline model – implementation lags and implementation
costs as well as taste shocks between private and public consumption – contribute towards the
model’s ﬁt to the data? We address this question in two steps: Table 4 stays within the class
of models with implementation lags, but, one step at a time, removes implementation costs
and the taste shocks for public consumption from the baseline calibration, keeping all other
parameters the same. Table 5 then shows how a model without implementation lags fails to re-
produce the initially increasing correlogram between public consumption and output/private
consumption in the data. This is the case even when the model is recalibrated to minimize the
same quadratic form as the baseline calibration.
Starting from the ﬁfth column in Table 4 we see that a model with no implementation costs
and only aggregate productivity shocks fails to match the data in two important dimensions.
The model delivers no persistence of public consumption and overstates the level of the dy-
namic correlation between public consumption and lagged private consumption/output. It
does do a good job in producing the right amount of volatility for public consumption. In-
troducing the taste shocks (column four) into the economy remedies the second failure, but
worsens the persistence problem and leads, not surprisingly, to excess volatility in public con-
12Table 4: THE ROLE OF IMPLEMENTATION COSTS AND TASTE SHOCKS
Business Cycle Baseline No Taste No Implementation No Taste Shock Data
Moment Model Shock Costs No Implementation Costs
std(G) 0.699 0.446 1.221 0.707 0.783
rho(G) 0.230 0.322 -0.013 0.085 0.296
correl(G,Y ) -0.136 -0.204 -0.059 -0.052 0.003
correl(G,Y¡1) 0.564 0.841 0.568 0.974 0.306
correl(G,Y¡2) 0.307 0.461 0.096 0.149 0.375
correl(G,C) 0.184 0.154 0.150 0.248 0.217
correl(G,C¡1) 0.300 0.964 0.163 0.965 0.302
correl(G,C¡2) 0.121 0.361 0.025 -0.003 0.320
std(C) 0.569 0.511 0.564 0.505 0.705
rho(C) 0.124 0.180 0.115 0.165 0.362
correl(C,Y ) 0.838 0.931 0.839 0.935 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.258 0.295 0.239 0.277 0.223
Notes: seenotestoTable2. The‘BaselineModel’featuresbothaone-yearimplementationlagandimplementation
costs (­ Æ 15), ²µ Æ 0.005. The ‘No Taste Shock’ model is identical to the ‘Baseline Model’, but sets ²µ Æ 0. The
‘No Implementation Costs’ model is identical to the ‘Baseline Model’, but sets ­ Æ 0. The ‘No Taste Shock - No
Implementation Costs’ model is a combination of columns three and four.
sumption. Conversely, introducingbudgetimplementationcostsonly(columnthree)ﬁxesper-
sistence and, somewhat, the oversynchronisation issue between public consumption and the
other macroeconomic aggregates, but causes insufﬁcient volatility. Combining both features
leads to a model that matches the data reasonably well.
This is interesting for two reasons: the fact that the “simpler” model in column ﬁve gets
the volatility of public consumption approximately right, but fails in two other important di-
mensions of business cycle ﬂuctuations, shows that within the class of models studied both
additional features – implementation costs and taste shocks – are required by the data. Starting
from the “simpler” model in column ﬁve, any additional shock that affects public consump-
tion will always lead to excess volatility, whereas implementation costs will lead to insufﬁcient
volatility of public consumption. A combination of the two ingredients is therefore necessary
to match the data. This means, secondly, that the physical environment studied here features
a standard ampliﬁcation-propagation trade-off. There is, however, a priori no reason to believe
that this trade-off can be reconciled with the data in a way such that the dynamic oversynchro-
nisation between public consumption and the overall cycle is sufﬁciently, but not excessively
dampened.
13We next study the role of implementation lags. The government decides now about G, not








sumption and makes it less persistent (column three in Table 5). Implementation lags thus play
a similar role as implementation costs (see Table 4). Their main effect, however, is to get the
roughshapeofthecorrelogrambetweenpublicconsumptionandprivateconsumption/output
right.
Table 5: THE ROLE OF IMPLEMENTATION LAGS
Business Cycle No Implementation Lag No Implementation Lag Baseline Data
Moment Recalibrated Param. from Baseline Model
std(G) 0.718 1.033 0.699 0.783
rho(G) 0.257 0.193 0.230 0.296
correl(G,Y ) 0.387 0.322 -0.136 0.003
correl(G,Y¡1) 0.280 0.202 0.564 0.306
correl(G,Y¡2) 0.070 0.030 0.307 0.375
correl(G,C) 0.178 -0.031 0.184 0.217
correl(G,C¡1) 0.122 0.034 0.300 0.302
correl(G,C¡2) 0.019 0.036 0.121 0.320
std(C) 0.537 0.562 0.569 0.705
rho(C) 0.142 0.116 0.124 0.362
correl(C,Y ) 0.851 0.823 0.838 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.277 0.253 0.258 0.223
Notes: see notes to Table 2. The second column shows the results of a model where public consumption is decided
oncontemporaneously, butimplementationcostsandthevolatilityoftherelativetasteshockbetweenprivateand
public consumption have been calibrated to minimize the same quadratic form as the ‘Baseline Model’: ­ Æ 25,
²µ Æ 0.004. The third column shows the results of a model where public consumption is decided on contempora-
neously, but the implementation costs parameter and the volatility of the relative taste shock are set equal to those
in the ‘Baseline Model’: ­Æ15, ²µ Æ0.005.
Column three displays the results of a model simulation where current G is decided on in
the current period, but the parameters for implementation costs and the standard deviation
of the taste shocks are ﬁxed at their values from the baseline model with implementation lags.
Without implementation lags the volatility of public consumption shoots up, its persistence
9G¡1 denotes last period’s public consumption. Notice that for the computation the public consumption that
was decided on last period remains a state variable as long as ­È0. Therefore, in the deﬁnition of the equilibrium
functionsG replacesG0 andG¡1 replacesG as long as ­È0. If ­Æ0, then we have one state variable,G¡1, less.
14goes down and any correlation with private consumption at all horizons is eliminated. From
this result it can be expected that recalibration of ­ and ²µ to minimize the same weighted
quadratic form as the baseline model, but under the assumption of no implementation lags,
will lead to a combination of higher implementation costs and/or lower variance of the taste
shock. Thisisindeedthecase: therecalibratedmodel(columntwo)has­Æ25(upfrom­Æ15)
and ²µ Æ 0.004 (down from ²µ Æ 0.005). This model gets the volatility and persistence of public
consumption right, even a little better than the baseline model, but fails to deliver the dynamic
correlogram between public consumption and other macroeconomic aggregates qualitatively;
i.e., in this model the dynamic correlation is lower than the contemporaneous one. Moreover,
theaveragedeviationofthemodel-generatedbusinesscyclemomentsfromtheirdatacounter-
parts as a fraction of their standard deviations is 1.44 in the recalibrated model with no imple-
mentation lags, whereas it is 1.16 in the baseline model.
4.3 Alternative Model Speciﬁcations
In this section we discuss the sensitivity of our results to the speciﬁcation of the felicity func-
tion over private consumption, public consumption and leisure. In our baseline speciﬁcation
the taste shock was directly between private and public consumption, see (1). There is another
possible grouping of commodities in which the µ¡shock becomes a taste shock between pub-







In this speciﬁcation, an increase in µ not only leads to a (persistent) expansion in private
consumption, but also to a (persistent) reduction in labor supply and therefore output. This
potentially means that a µ¡shock is a much more potent driver of aggregate ﬂuctuations in this
felicity speciﬁcation than in the baseline one.
This is indeed conﬁrmed by comparing the third and the ﬁfth column of Table 6, which
show that the model with the alternative felicity function under the same parameterization as
the baseline model exhibits excess volatility both compared to the baseline model and the data.
A lower standard deviation for the µ¡shock in the recalibrated version of the alternative model
is required (see column two of Table 6); ²µ declines from 0.005 to 0.003. It also means that the
relative contribution of the aggregate productivity shock to the business ﬂuctuations of pub-
lic consumption is considerably reduced, from 41 percent in the baseline speciﬁcation to 24
percent (see Table 7). We also study a speciﬁcation with perfectly inelastic labor supply, which
behaves very similarly to the baseline model, both in terms of ﬁt to the data, but also in terms
15Table 6: THE ROLE OF THE FELICITY FUNCTION AND LABOR SUPPLY
Business Cycle Alternative Alternative Perfectly Baseline Data
Moment Felicity Felicity Inelastic Model
Recalibrated Param. from Baseline Model Labor Supply
std(G) 0.765 1.464 0.740 0.699 0.783
rho(G) 0.252 0.180 0.223 0.230 0.296
correl(G,Y ) -0.161 -0.125 -0.102 -0.136 0.003
correl(G,Y¡1) 0.486 0.394 0.569 0.564 0.306
correl(G,Y¡2) 0.298 0.194 0.291 0.307 0.375
correl(G,C) 0.150 0.163 0.169 0.184 0.217
correl(G,C¡1) 0.331 -0.019 0.313 0.300 0.302
correl(G,C¡2) 0.147 -0.000 0.125 0.121 0.320
std(C) 0.525 0.551 0.609 0.569 0.705
rho(C) 0.165 0.131 0.120 0.124 0.362
correl(C,Y ) 0.872 0.783 0.868 0.838 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.292 0.272 0.245 0.258 0.223
Notes: see notes to Table 2. The ﬁrst column shows the results of a model where the felicity function over pri-
vate consumption, public consumption and leisure is given by (10) instead of (1). Implementation costs and the
volatility of the relative taste shock between private and public consumption have been calibrated to minimize the
same quadratic form as the ‘Baseline Model’: ­ Æ 25, ²µ Æ 0.003. ¯ µ Æ 0.94. The second column shows the results
of a model where the felicity function over private consumption, public consumption and leisure is given by (10)
instead of (1), but the implementation costs parameter and the volatility of the relative taste shock are set equal to
those from the ‘Baseline Model’: ­ Æ 15, ²µ Æ 0.005. ¯ µ Æ 0.94. The third column shows the results of a model with
inelastic labor supply, i.e. ´ Æ 1. In this case the minimizing ­ and ²µ happen to be the same as in the baseline
case, but in order to match the volatility of output the standard deviation of the aggregate productivity shock has
to be increased to 0.0180. ¯ µ Æ0.86 in this case.
of the variance decomposition exercise. Inelastic labor supply only requires us to increase the
volatilityoftheexogenousaggregateproductivityshocknecessarytomatchthevolatilityofout-
put in the economy. As usual, elastic labor supply ampliﬁes aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Table 7: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION - VARIOUS MODELS
Contribution of z-shocks Contribution of µ-shocks Both
Baseline 40.82% 49.49% 90.31%
Alternative Felicity 24.28% 70.37% 94.65%
Inelastic Labor Supply 41.65% 57.09% 98.74%
Notes: see notes to Tables 2, 3 and 6.
16Figure 1 sheds additional light on the role of endogenous labor supply in the felicity func-
tion for the propagation of the µ-shocks into the economy. It shows for aggregate output, in-
vestment, private and public consumption the theoretical impulse response functions, in log
deviations from a steady state, to a standardized taste shock towards private consumption (in-
crease in µ) for the model with the baseline felicity and the model with the alternative felicity.
In the baseline case, an increase in µ leads to an increase in labor supply and therefore contem-
poraneously to a (small) increase in aggregate output. This means that public consumption
does not need to fall as much, in order to satisfy the increased taste in private consumption
goods. Conversely, in the alternative speciﬁcation, a positive taste shock towards the private
consumption bundle leads to less labor supply and therefore contemporaneously to a (large)
fall in aggregate output which is propagated through a reduction in capital accumulation. The
effects of a taste switch on public consumption are much more severe in this case and, there-
fore, the µ-shock is much more potent in generating ﬂuctuations of government consumption.
Figure 1: Theoretical Impulse Response Functions to a µ-Shock










































































































































































Government Consumption − θ−Shock
Notes: this Figure shows the theoretical impulse responses – expressed in percentage deviations from a steady
state – to the same µ-shock for the baseline model (blue solid lines) and the model with the alternative felicity
function (10) (dashed red lines), both with ­Æ15, ²µ Æ0.005 (see Table 6 for details). Speciﬁcally, we set z Æ1 and
keep the economy at the lower value for µ until it reaches a steady state. We then increase µ to its upper value and
let µ drop back probabilistically, according to its transition matrix. The reported IRF is the average over those time
paths.
175 Conclusion
We document the business cycle behavior of various subaggregates of government purchases,
inparticularstateandlocalgovernmentconsumption. Weprovideatractableworkhorsemodel
that is as close as possible to standard quantitative macroeconomic models in order to match
important business cycle features of public consumption. We argue that both implementa-
tion lags and implementation costs in the budgeting process plus taste shocks for public con-
sumption relative to private consumption are essential to generate this match. We then use this
modeltodecomposethevarianceofpublicconsumptionintoﬂuctuationsthatareendogenous
responses of the policy maker to changing macroeconomic conditions versus ﬂuctuations that
are the direct result of taste shocks in the populace between private and public consumption.
Dependingontheprecisespeciﬁcationofthefelicityfunctionoverprivateconsumption,public
consumption and leisure, 25 to 40 percent of the variance of public consumption is explained
by aggregate productivity shocks. Some model features used here are rather stylized and need
a better microfoundation. We view this paper as a ﬁrst step into using quantitative macroeco-
nomic reasoning to explain observed ﬂuctuations of public policy variables.
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20A Data Appendix
Table 8: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS - GOVERNMENT PURCHASES - FUNCTIONAL DISAGGREGATION
Moment rho(¢) correl(¢,Y ) correl(¢,Y¡1) correl(¢,Y¡2) Frac.
1st-order of GSL
General public service 0.316 0.050 0.190 0.2138 10.72 %
Public order and safety -0.021 -0.091 0.308 0.501 13.90%
Economic affairs 0.481 0.450 0.455 0.059 19.40%
Transportation 0.466 0.489 0.371 -0.002 15.17%
Other economic affairs 0.107 0.163 0.486 0.208 4.20%
Housing & comm. serv. 0.037 0.003 0.266 0.600 3.77%
Health 0.004 -0.348 0.014 0.179 3.51%
Recreation and culture 0.219 -0.290 0.348 0.490 1.98%
Education 0.477 0.264 0.459 0.334 42.98%
Elementary and secondary 0.460 0.235 0.349 0.350 34.90%
Higher 0.083 0.238 0.496 0.076 6.57%
Libraries and other 0.190 0.090 0.365 0.336 1.76%
Income security 0.198 0.205 0.117 -0.049 3.88%
Notes: data source is the BEA (NIPA data). All variables are annual, the sample goes from 1960-2006. They are
deﬂated by their corresponding deﬂators, logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing pa-
rameter 6.25. ‘rho(¢)’ denotes the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of an aggregate variable. ‘correl(¢,Y )’ denotes the
contemporaneous correlation with aggregate GDP , ‘correl(¢,Y¡1)’ and ‘correl(¢,Y¡2)’ the correlation with aggre-
gateGDPoneandtwoyearslagged, respectively. ‘Frac. ofGSL’denotesthefractionofthecorrespondingaggregate
withrespecttototalstateandlocalgovernmentpurchases(thereisnotconsumption/investmentdistinctioninthe
functional disaggregation). ‘Housing & comm. serv.’ stands for ‘Housing and community services’.
21Table 9: BUSINESS CYCLE FACTS - GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION - BANDPASS FILTER(2,8)
Moment GSLC GNDC GND GC G CNDS
std(¢) 0.719 0.742 0.871 1.041 1.195 0.627
rho(¢) 0.243 0.170 0.335 0.450 0.512 0.289
correl(¢,Y ) -0.122 -0.138 0.131 -0.066 0.024 0.856
correl(¢,Y¡1) 0.254 0.252 0.427 0.245 0.381 0.121
correl(¢,Y¡2) 0.413 0.453 0.495 0.425 0.476 -0.398
correl(¢,CNDS) 0.051 -0.015 0.158 -0.074 -0.008 -
correl(¢,CNDS¡1) 0.202 0.195 0.399 0.105 0.263 -
correl(¢,CNDS¡2) 0.377 0.483 0.547 0.400 0.457 -
Notes: datasourceistheBEA(NIPAdata). Allvariablesareannual,theyrangefrom1960-2006. Theyaredeﬂatedby
their corresponding deﬂators, logged and ﬁltered with a Bandpass Filter that deﬁnes business cycle frequencies as
frequenciesrangingfrom2to8years. ‘GSLC’standsforstateandlocalgovernmentconsumption. ‘GNDC’denotes
total non-defense consumption, ‘GND’ total non-defense purchases and ‘GC’ total government consumption. ‘G’
is total government purchases.‘std(¢)’ denotes the time series volatility of an aggregate variable, rho(¢) its ﬁrst-
order autocorrelation. ‘correl(¢,Y )’ denotes the contemporaneous correlation with aggregate GDP , ‘correl(¢,Y¡1)
’ and ‘correl(¢,Y¡2)’ the correlation with aggregate GDP one and two years lagged, respectively. ‘CNDS’ stands for
nondurable and services consumption.
Figure 2: Contemporaneous Correlation of GDP and Public Consumption by State


















































Correlation Between  Real State G−CONS and  Real State GDP
Notes: real GDP by state is taken from the BEA. Public consumption by state is measured as the ‘Total Current
Operations’ category from the Annual Survey of State Government Finances from the Census, which we deﬂate by
astate-speciﬁcdeﬂatorforgovernmentpurchases,computedfromBEAdataontotalnominalandrealgovernment
purchases. All variables are annual, the sample goes from 1977-2006. They are logged and ﬁltered with a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 6.25.
22Figure 3: Dynamic Correlation of GDP (one year lagged) and Public Consumption by State



















































Dynamic Correlation Between  Real State G−CONS and  Real State GDP
Notes: see notes to Figure 2.
Figure 4: Dynamic Correlation of GDP (one year lagged) and Public Consumption Versus the
Contemporaneous Correlation






































Notes: see notes to Figure 2. Each point represents a U.S. state and the line is a 45-degree line.
23B Numerical Appendix
Computational Algorithm
We solve the MPE using a ﬁxed point iteration procedure from (H,ª) onto itself. The algo-
rithm can be summarized as follows (for the baseline case):
Algorithm 1 Fixed Point Iteration on (H,ª)
Step 0: Select a grid for the capital stock K and government consumption G, and ﬁx the func-





the initially conjectured functions
¡
H0,ª0¢
. Set up a convergence criterion ".
Step 1: In step n, imposing (Hn,ªn) in the best-response optimization problem, use value func-
tion iteration to solve the household’s parametric dynamic programming problem. Get the con-
tinuation value function vn(k,K,G,z;ªn,Hn).
Step 2: Without imposing ªn and instead varying G0 freely on a ﬁnite grid, use Hn and






Step3: SimulatetheeconomyusingNH Æ1householdsandT periods. Ineachperiodt ofthesim-
ulation, calculate the equilibrium policy G
0eq.
t by maximizing Jn¡
K,K,G,z,G0;ªn,Hn¢
. Calcu-
late the best response decision based on hn¡
K,K,G,z,G0;ªn,Hn¢
for both equilibrium G
0eq.
t and
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, with a total sample size of T (1ÅNG).





2}, which with a slight abuse of notation we summarize as
¡
b Hn, b ªn¢
. No-
tice that b Hn is updated on both the on- and off-equilibrium paths, b ªn only on the equilibrium
path.
Step 5: If jHn ¡ b HnjÇ" and jªn ¡ b ªnjÇ", stop. Otherwise, set
HnÅ1 Æ ®H £ b Hn Å(1¡®H)£Hn,
ªnÅ1 Æ ®ª£ b ªn Å(1¡®ª)£ªn,
with ®H,®ª 2(0,1], and go to step 1.10
10We choose " Æ 10¡4 and T Æ 10,000, of which we discard the ﬁrst 500 observations, when we update the tran-
sition and policy rules or compute summary statistics. To eliminate sampling error, we use the same series of
aggregate shocks for all iterations in the algorithm and across all model simulations.
24Table 10: THE EQUILIBRIUM LAW OF MOTION FOR CAPITAL - BASELINE MODEL - EQUATION (7)
µ Æ0.8469
Parameter z Æ0.9384 z Æ0.9687 z Æ1 z Æ1.0323 z Æ1.0657
a0(¢,µ1) -0.7499 -0.6696 -0.6028 -0.5397 -0.4897
a1(¢,µ1) 0.8539 0.8543 0.8532 0.8511 0.8471
a2(¢,µ1) 0.0778 0.0751 0.0728 0.0695 0.0658
a3(¢,µ1) -0.7691 -0.7041 -0.6519 -0.6022 -0.5660
a4(¢,µ1) -0.2742 -0.2539 -0.2378 -0.2225 -0.2110
a5(¢,µ1) -0.0269 -0.0249 -0.0233 -0.0219 -0.0208
a6(¢,µ1) 0.0466 0.0458 0.0453 0.0445 0.0433
µ Æ0.8554
Parameter z Æ0.9384 z Æ0.9687 z Æ1 z Æ1.0323 z Æ1.0657
a0(¢,µ2) -0.7464 -0.6806 -0.6107 -0.5447 -0.4880
a1(¢,µ2) 0.8552 0.8549 0.8531 0.8512 0.8474
a2(¢,µ2) 0.0776 0.0743 0.0728 0.0694 0.0654
a3(¢,µ2) -0.7644 -0.7112 -0.6580 -0.6054 -0.5625
a4(¢,µ2) -0.2726 -0.2558 -0.2394 -0.2232 -0.2095
a5(¢,µ2) -0.0267 -0.0251 -0.0235 -0.0219 -0.0206
a6(¢,µ2) 0.0464 0.0455 0.0450 0.0443 0.0429
Notes: this table displays the coefﬁcients for the equilibrium law of motion for the (natural logarithm of the) aggre-
gate capital stock, equation (7), for the baseline case. Recall equation (7):
logK 0 Æ a0(z,µ)Åa1(z,µ)logK Åa2(z,µ)logG Åa3(z,µ)logG0Å
a4(z,µ)(logG0)2Åa5(z,µ)(logG0)3Åa6(z,µ)logGlogG0;
25Table 11: THE EQUILIBRIUM GOVERNMENT POLICY FUNCTION FOR G0 - BASELINE MODEL -
EQUATION (8)
µ Æ0.8469
Parameter z Æ0.9384 z Æ0.9687 z Æ1 z Æ1.0323 z Æ1.0657
b0(¢,µ1) -1.9466 -1.9037 -1.8808 -1.8882 -1.8926
b1(¢,µ1) 0.2069 0.2178 0.2428 0.2714 0.2849
b2(¢,µ1) 0.3526 0.3633 0.3674 0.3609 0.3540
µ Æ0.8554
Parameter z Æ0.9384 z Æ0.9687 z Æ1 z Æ1.0323 z Æ1.0657
b0(¢,µ2) -1.9444 -1.9133 -1.8824 -1.8827 -1.8853
b1(¢,µ2) 0.2060 0.2159 0.2388 0.2711 0.2874
b2(¢,µ2) 0.3587 0.3654 0.3720 0.3682 0.3622
Notes: thistabledisplaysthecoefﬁcientsfortheequilibriumgovernmentpolicyfunctionforthe(naturallogarithm
of)tomorrow’sgovernmentconsumption,equation(8),forthebaselinecase. Recallequation(8): logG0 Æb0(z,µ)Å
b1(z,µ)logK Åb2(z,µ)logG.
26Table 12: DIFFERENT LAWS OF MOTION
Business Cycle Moment Baseline Model Linear Law of Motion Data
std(G) 0.699 0.776 0.783
rho(G) 0.230 0.212 0.296
correl(G,Y ) -0.136 -0.121 0.003
correl(G,Y¡1) 0.564 0.610 0.306
correl(G,Y¡2) 0.307 0.294 0.375
correl(G,C) 0.184 0.181 0.217
correl(G,C¡1) 0.300 0.339 0.302
correl(G,C¡2) 0.121 0.114 0.320
std(C) 0.569 0.574 0.705
rho(C) 0.124 0.116 0.362
correl(C,Y ) 0.838 0.847 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.258 0.245 0.223
Notes: seenotestoTable2. Thesecondcolumndisplaystheresultsforthesameparametersasthe‘BaselineModel’,
except that the equilibrium law of motion for the (natural logarithm of the) aggregate capital stock, equation (7),
only contains the ﬁrst four, i.e. linear, terms with coefﬁcients a0 to a3.
Table 13: WEIGHTING
Business Cycle Moment Weighting Data
std(G) 0.118 0.783
rho(G) 0.096 0.296








correl(C,Y ) 0.024 0.862
correl(C,Y¡1) 0.024 0.223
Notes: see notes to Table 2. The second column displays the standard deviations of the twelve business cycle
moments used for the matching exercise from 2,000 nonparametric bootstrap simulations for GDP , private con-
sumption (‘CNDS’) and public consumption (‘GSLC’) with non-overlapping blocks of eight years. They are the
weighting coefﬁcients in the quadratic form to be minimized (see Section 3.3).
27C Results Appendix
Table 14: BASELINE RESULT - STATISTICS FOR G
Y - AND C
Y -RATIOS
Business Cycle Moment Baseline Model Data
std(G
Y ) 0.271 0.608
rho(G
Y ) 0.494 0.900
correl(G
Y ,Y ) -0.697 -0.283
correl(G
Y ,Y¡1) 0.090 -0.050
correl(G
Y ,Y¡2) 0.263 0.152
correl(G
Y ,C) -0.494 -0.131
correl(G
Y ,C¡1) 0.151 -0.057
correl(G
Y ,C¡2) 0.313 0.149
std(C
Y ) 1.078 0.967
rho(C
Y ) 0.562 0.701
correl(C
Y ,Y ) -0.703 -0.606
correl(C
Y ,Y¡1) -0.010 -0.251
Notes: see notes to Table 2.
28